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Abstract: With this paper we build a two-region model where 
both innovation and imitation are performed. In particular 
imitation takes the form of technological spillovers that lagging 
regions may exploit given certain human capital conditions. We 
show how the high skill content of each region’s workforce 
(rather than the average human capital stock) is crucial to 
determine convergence towards the income level of the leader 
region and to exploit the technological spillovers coming from 
the frontier. The same applies to bureaucratic/institutional quality 
which are conductive to higher growth in the long run. We test 
successfully our theoretical result over Spanish regions for the 
period between 1960 and 1997. We exploit system GMM 
estimators which allow us to correctly deal with endogeneity 
problems and small sample bias. 
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It is usually argued how di⁄erences in the economic development of countries and
regions depend on the di⁄erences in productivity levels. With this argument,
nonethless, we are not giving any particular insight on how regions which are
dramatically lagging behing in GDP per capita levels may actually improve on
their economic situation w.r.t. the developed regions.
The argument of technology di⁄erences is usually accompained by the state-
ment that human capital should be considered as one of the main factors boost-
ing economic progress and growth both from a national and a regional view
point. Nonetheless, recently, some doubts on the positive impact of human cap-
ital on economic growth arised. As pointed out by de la Fuente and DomØnech
(2006) from in a cross-country perspective. Many recent papers and empirical
investigations found weak correlation between education variables and economic
growth.
Why is that? We pursue the idea that the composition of human capital
(the ratio of skilled over unskilled workers) rather than the average value of the
stock, in￿ uences the processes of technology adoption and invention and, at the
end of the day, drives economic growth and convergence in income levels.
Human capital, skills and institutional quality are the economic fundamen-
tals that shape the form by which technology evolves within an economy. De-
pending on these economic fundamentals technological progress may take the
form of either innovation or imitation and adoption. This, on the other hand,
shapes and de￿nes the growth possibilities of each region.
At early stages of development least developed regions may take advantage
of their backwardness by imitating technologies discovered at the frontier. The
process of technology adoption is not immediate however and it crucually de-
pends on the recipient country￿ s ability to implement these new technologies.
In our paper we assume that di⁄erences in human capital composition play
a fundamental role in the speed by which lagging regions are able to exploit
technological spillovers coming from close but more technologically advanced
regions. By "human capital composition", as pointed out before, we refer to
the region speci￿c ratio of skilled over unskilled workers. We assume that it is
the "skilled" fraction of the workforce to matter in the process of technology
growth rather than the average human capital stock of an economy or region.
Other explanations and alternative theories can be recently found in the
empirical and theoretical literature pointing to the negative role that higher ed-
ucation would have in the process of catch-up across countries and regions.1 We
1A related paper on regional economic growth which embraces the point of view that
primary education only is leading to catch-up of the least developed regions is that of Diliberto
(2006) for the Italian case.
2believe these theories to be counter-intuitive and probably related to spurious
econometric results when not fully dealing with endogeneity issues related to
the treatment of human capital in catch-up regressions.
From a theoretical point of view their argument is that technology imita-
tion/adoption is not a costly activity (not even a skill-demanding one) so that
imitation can be better performed by unskilled workers. However, there ex-
ist a good deal of empirical evidence (see for instance Teece (1977), Mans￿eld,
Schwartz and Wagner (1981) or Behnabib and Spiegel (2005)) which is pointing
to the "skill-costliness" of imitation and adoption of technologies. To put it in
other words, we believe that technology adoption and imitation, since relying on
reverse engineering activities or other forms of technical adoption, will be faster
and stronger the higher is the technical and scienti￿c content of the workforce
in the recipient (follower) economy. "Unpacking" a technology in order to copy
it or to imitate it is a skill-demanding acitivity which will be clearly better per-
formed by specialized and trained workforce than by a relatively less educated
one.
Ceteris paribus, if two technologically follower regions di⁄er in their human
capital skills, the economy with the higher number of engineers will be able to
perfom better, more and faster the reverse engineering needed to adopt tech-
nologies discovered at the frontier and then it will eventually catch-up faster
with the frontier. China is a clear example of a developing country heavily rely-
ing on technology imitation which is lately trying to increase the technical and
educational content of its workforce so as to exploit the bene￿ts from imitation
and adoption possibilities.
With this paper we try to give some insights on these issues by analyzing
the growth dynamics of two regions (region 1 and region 2) which di⁄er in
their development stage, composition of human capital, institutional quality
and relative costs of innovation and imitation. We do so by merging some of
the relevant features of the model by Helpman (1993) with those of the growth
model by Barro and Sala-i-Martin (1997) and with the analysis of the impact of
di⁄erences in human capital composition proposed by Vandenbussche, Aghion
and Meghir (2004) on the process of technology innovation and adoption.
The remainder of the paper is as follows. In section 2 we give the basic setup
of the model focusing on the main variables which will be analyzed throughout
the paper. In section 3 we depict the behaviour of region 1 (the leader) and set
the conditions by which innovation is performed at the frontier. In section 4,
instead, we will describe region 2 (the follower) and the setup for imitation by
focusing particularly on the costliness of imitation and adoption of technologies
discovered at the frontier and on the impact of human capital composition
and di⁄erences in institutional quality. Section 5 will be devoted to the study
of the steady state growth and to the analysis of the transitional dynamics
which leads the follower to theoretically converge towards the leader. Section
36, instead, shows our main theoretical results by analyzing the reaction of the
follower economy to changes in the main variables of the model. We will analyze
how these changes a⁄ect the decision of whether to perform imitation (and its
optimality) rather than innovation and the e⁄ects on the long-run technological
distance between the two regions. In section 7 we test empirically the main
results of the theoretical model for Spanish regions for the period in between
1960 and 1997 both for regions and provinces. Due to the peculiarity of the
data used, that is educational attainment levels and GDP gaps, we choose to
estimate the underlying relations by making use of the system GMM estimators
which allow us to build internal instrumental sets and to address many of the
problems facing dynamic panel models. Section 8 concludes.
2 Setup of the model
Our model focuses on the dynamics linking the rich and technologically ad-
vanced regions to those persistently lagging behind. The theoretical analysis we
propose, therefore, aims at examining how technology ￿ ows from the technolog-
ical core of a nation, represented by its technologically developed regions and
areas, to the less developed ones and how these spillovers change the economic
prospects for these regions.
In particular we will be looking at the role that regional di⁄erences in human
capital composition may play in these dynamics. For simplicity of exposition
we will be assuming throughout the paper that only two regions exist and that
these represent the technological leaders and followers. The two regions, denoted
by i=1,2, represent respectively the technologically advanced regions and those,
which instead are lagging behind.
The output in the representative region is expressed by means of a Spence





where 0 < ￿ < 1, Yi is output and Xji is the quantity of the jth nondurable
intermediate good used in the production by region i. Ni is the number of
types of intermediates available in region i. As in Barro and Sala-i-Martin
(1997) we use the variable Ni to proxy for the technological level of region i.
The technology shown in eq. (1) can be accessed by all agents in region i and
production occurs under competitive conditions. Lyi is instead the labor force
employed in the production of output Yi
2.
2Trade is assumed to be balanced between the two regions such that the domestic output
is equal to the total of domestic expenditures which go for consumption of goods, Ci, pro-
duction of intermediates, Xji, and R&D aimed at discovering new blueprints and varieties of
intermediates.
4Ai represents institutional quality of regional governments. This variable
captures the quality of the administration of local powers at regional level. This
is particularly important within a nation like Spain which delegates many of its
central powers to its Comunidades Autonomas which have large powers in bud-
getary and economic matters. It also captures all other unobservable di⁄erences
across regions that are not explicitly modeled such as infrastructures and so on.
In our empirical investigation we will proxy Ai by the overall economic environ-
ment within which each region and province is found by making use of an index
of social capital3. We assume that region 1 owns more developed institutions
than region 2 as follows:
A1 > A2 (2)
The intuition is that regions with better institutional quality are also those
which ceteris paribus experience higher levels of GDP per capita.
2.1 Regional di⁄erences in Human capital composition
We assume labor in the 2 regions to be heterogeneous in skills and human
capital levels. In both regions a fraction of population will be of the low skill
type, namely Lyi, and employed in the production of the ￿nal good Yi .
The remaining fraction of the workforce, namely Lri, represents the high
skilled workers which will be employed in the R&D activities of region 1and 2.
The following general condition is hence satis￿ed:
Li = Lyi + Lri (3)
where Li is the total workforce which we normalize to 1. Lyi and Lri rep-
resent respectively the low and high skilled shares of total workforce for region
i. Noticeably, region 1 and region 2 di⁄er in the composition of their human
capital stocks. Region 1, consistently with empirical evidence, is populated by
a relatively large share of high skilled workers (over its total population). This
assumption tries to capture the evidence of higher schooling levels in developed
regions than in developing ones. Our empirical investigation for spanish regions
con￿rms this assumption with "Madrid" being the technological and human
capital leader. Conversely, region 2, is largely populated by low skilled workers
and only a relatively small fraction of its total workforce is highly skilled.
This condition can be restated more formally as follows:
Lr1 > Lr2 (4)
3Social capital is de￿ned as the degree of those" relationships that evolve in the economic
sphere, particularly in employment, ￿nancial or investment markets, in which long-lasting
relationships exist in contexts of uncertainty and strategic interdependence".
5and, conversely









The basic setting we use in order to model innovation combines various fea-
tures of the formalizations of Barro and Sala-i-Martin (1997), Romer (1990)
and Helpman (1993). In principle, a region can increase its technology stock
(the pool of available intermediates for production N) either by inventing a new
blueprint or by imitating or adopting an existing one which is known in the
other region. In practice, however, we will be assuming that region 1 is initially
the only innovator and that region 2 bene￿ts from the discoveries made at the
relative technological frontier by means of regional technological spillovers.
Hence, we assume region 1 to be the technological leader. This is implied
by the following:
N1(0) > N2(0) (7)
where the pool of blueprints (or intermediates) that are known in region 1
is strictly higher than that in the technological follower region 24. The rela-






Throughout the paper we will be using the measure in eq.(8) to de￿ne the
relative development stage of region 2 w.r.t. the most advanced technological
area or region.
One of the crucial assumptions of our formalization is that innovation is a
costly activity and, on the other hand, that technology spillovers do not hap-
pen spontaneously but crucially depend on the characteristics of the recipient
regions, that is, on their particular human capital composition and skill levels.
Innovating, therefore, implies a unitary cost ￿i to be performed. This rep-
resents the income outlay that a region incurs to produce one new blueprint or
intermediate to be used in the production of the ￿nal good Yi.
4This is to say that there are no intermediates known in 2 that are unknown in 1 such
that region 1 never has the reason to imitate region 2.
6Instead of assuming a ￿xed cost for innovation as in Barro and Sala-i-Martin
(1997) we assume, somehow more realistically, that the marginal cost of in-
creasing the technology stock of a region is a negative function of the fraction
of population endowed with high skills. This is like saying that the relative
easiness of producing a unit of innovation increases with the fraction of highly
talented/educated researchers which are employed in the R&D sector. Our as-
sumption is similar to that of Aghion and Howitt (2005), Behnabib and Spiegel
(2005) or Grossman and Helpman (1981) who show how the human capital com-
position of the workforce, and not the average quality of human capital, is a
crucial determinant of the amount of innovation that an economy may produce.
Hence we assume the following cost function for innovation:
￿i =  (Lri)￿1 (9)
where, as pointed out before, ￿i represents the cost of coming up with a new
blueprint and Lri is instead the share of high skilled workers employed in the
R&D sector producing new knowledge.5
Notice that eq. (9) with eq. (4) imply the following:
￿2 ￿ ￿1 (10)
The cost of producing a unit of innovation in region 1 is lower than in region
2 due to the higher share of high skilled workers employed in region 1 w.r.t.
those employed in region 2. The di⁄erent composition of human capital stocks
in the two regions shapes their relative innovative possibilities. The region
endowed with the higher fraction of high skilled labor ends up being relatively
more e¢ cient in producing innovation due to the more educated and talented
researchers employed in R&D.
Notice that this result is somehow similar to that of the theoretical model
of Vandenbussche, Aghion and Meghir (2004) where innovation is better per-
formed at the frontier than by followers. Crucially, however, we will show how
our setting, even if it conforms with this result, it does not also need to imply
the puzzling assumption that unskilled workers are better suited for imitation
activities (reverse engineering for example) than more skilled workers as in Van-
denbussche, Aghion and Meghir (2004).
For simplicity of exposition we assume for now that the shares of high and
low skilled workers in the two economies remain constant such that eq. (10)
holds over time6.
5We assume here, for simplicity, that   is a linear function. This may not be the case
however and more complexity may be added to the model in assuming a non linear relation
between the cost of innovation and the share of skilled workers employed in R&D. We believe
results will not change qualitatively.
6Results would be the same if we allowed human capital composition to slowly change over
time as in reality may happen. Mathematical tractability would be, however, more demanding
not adding much to the results.
7Let us now assume a new intermediate is introduced (invented) in region
1. The innovator initially retains monopoly power over the use of this good for
production7. Since the intermediate j is priced in region 1 at P1j the ￿ ow of
monopoly pro￿t to the inventor is given by:
￿1j = (P1j ￿ 1)X1j (11)
where the 1 inside the brackets represents the marginal cost of producing





This, in turns, leads to the demand function for the intermediate j from all
producers of goods:
X1j = Ly1(A1￿=P1j)1=1￿￿ (13)
By substituting eq.(13) into eq.(11) we get the monopoly price, which is the
same for all types of intermediates:
P1j = P1 = 1=￿ > 1 (14)
This in turns implies that the total quantity of the jth intermediate that
region i will be producing amounts to the following:
X1j = X1 = Ly1(A1)1=(1￿￿)￿2=(1￿￿) (15)
From this we ￿nally get region￿ s 1 total output by substituting eq.(15) into
eq.(1) which gives:
Y1 = (A1)1=(1￿￿)￿2=(1￿￿)Ly1N1 (16)
Hence, total output is going to be a positive function of regions speci￿c
institutional/bureaucratic quality. Also, holding constant regions speci￿c insti-
tutional quality, output per capita is going to increase as the technology level
N, the number of intermediates available for production, increases8.
By susbsituting eq.(14) and eq.(15) into eq.(11) one can get the ￿ ow of
monopoly pro￿t from sales to the owner of the rights of intermediate j as follows:
￿1j = ￿1 = (1 ￿ ￿)Ly1(A1)1=(1￿￿)￿(1+￿)=(1￿￿) (17)
7As pointed out by Barro and Sala-i-Martin (1997), it is however simple to allow the good
to become competitive with an exogenous probability p per unit of time.
8It is di¢ cult to see from eq. (16) the partial e⁄ect of an increase of respectively the skilled
or of the unskilled fraction of workforce on total output since N is a function of human capital
composition. We will show in the next sections how it is the increase of the high skill share of
the workforce to be growth enhancing while an increase in the fraction of population endowed
with low skills will result to be growth detrimental.
8As argued by Barro and Sala-i-Martin (1997) the present value of pro￿ts for
the jth innovator is simply ￿1j=r1, where r1 is the rate of return in region 1.
When free entry is assumed into the R&D sector (and the quantity of R&D is
nonzero) it must be that the present value of pro￿ts must equal the constant cost
of invention ￿1 at each point in time. Hence, rearrangement of the free-entry






(A1)1=(1￿￿)￿2=(1￿￿) = ￿1=￿1 (18)
where the rate of return r1 is the ratio of ￿1, the ￿ ow of monopoly pro￿t
given in eq.(17), to the cost ￿1 of obtaining this pro￿t ￿ ow.
We assume that consumers maximize utility over in￿nite horizons through





(C1￿￿ ￿ 1)=(1 ￿ ￿)
￿
dt (19)
where, as usual ￿ > 0 represents the rate of time preference and ￿ > 0
the magnitude of the elasticity of the marginal utility of consumption9. If we
maximize the utility function subject to a standard budget constraint we obtain
the usual expression for the consumption growth rate:
￿
C1=C1 = (1=￿)(r1 ￿ ￿) (20)
where the growth rate of C1 is constant due to the constancy of r1 as in
eq.(18). Hence, the growth rate of the economy in full equilibrium is given by :







where the parameters of the model are such that ￿1=￿1 ￿ ￿ ensures positive
growth.
4 Imitation/adoption in the follower region
4.1 Technology spillovers
Technology spillovers from the technologically developed region to the follower
do not take place spontaneously. Imitation and adaptation of leading-edge tech-
nologies imply a cost for the follower. The costliness of imitation is widely ob-
served and acknowledged in theoretical and empirical literature. Maskus, Saggi
and Puttitanun (2004), Mans￿eld, Schwartz and Wagner (1981), Coe and Help-
man (1995) or Behnabib and Spiegel (2005) point out how the cost of both the
9This implies the intertemporal elasticity of subsitution being equal to 1=￿:
9adaptation and imitation of technologies discovered at the frontier (or in other
technological sectors) is usually positive but relatively lower than the cost of
innovation.
As argued by Maskus (2000), imitation usually takes the form of adaptations
of existing technologies to new markets10. Mans￿eld, Schwartz and Wagner
(1981) point out for instance how, over 48 di⁄erent products in chemical, drug,
electronics and machinery U.S. industries, the costs of imitation lied between
40% and 90% of the costs of innovation. On the same line the empirical results
of Teece (1977) who estimated the cost of technology transfer across regions to
be equal, on average, to 19% of total project expenditure. Nelson and Phelps
(1966) argue, moreover, how imitation and adoption imply an investment in
human capital while Abramovitz (1986) emphasises the role played by social
and institutional resources in order for follower regions to adopt technologies
discovered at the frontier.
We build on previous theoretical literature and express the cost function for







where ￿2, representing the cost of imitation in region 2, is assumed to be a
function of ￿2, and of N2=N1 the proximity to the frontier.
Few things are worth noticing. First of all, in the fashion of Connolly and
Valderrama (2005) and Barro and Sala-i-Martin (1997) we assume the cost of
imitation to be an increasing function of the proximity of the imitator w.r.t.
the technological frontier. The rationale goes as follows. When it exists a large
pool of innovations (blueprints) from which an imitator can copy, the cost of
imitation tends to be low. This happens when the ratio N2=N1 is small and the
follower is relatively far from the frontier. When, the pool of blueprints available
for imitation shrinks, due to a higher proximity of the follower w.r.t. the leader,
the costs of imitation rise due to the fact that the remaining blueprints may be
those more di¢ cult to be imitated (or to be adjusted to production processes in
region 2). This happens when the ratio N2=N1 gets close to 1. Hence, similarly
to Barro and Sala-i-Martin (1997) when blueprints available for imitation in the
follower region are exahusted, the cost of imitation equals the cost of innovation,
￿2, since imitation cannot be performed anymore and possible technological
spillovers are completely exahusted.
The parameter ￿ aims at capturing the relative strength of the technological
spillovers coming from the frontier when geographical distances are allowed for.
In other words, we expect that the more distant the leader region is from the
10In an ongoing research we show how Spain is the ￿fth country in the EU for the degree and
intensity of adoption and di⁄usion of new products and processes. These results are obtained
by the exploitation of the third vawe of the Community Innovation Survey (CIS3).
10follower, the weaker the e⁄ect of the discoveries made at the frontier will be on
the follower. Technological specialization usually creates clusters of regions with
positive technological externalities. 11However, as soon as we increase the dis-
tance across regions the technological links tend to fade and economic and tech-
nological activities in leader regions to become less important w.r.t. geographi-
cally distant regions. More formally we assume ￿ > 1 such that the geographical
distance matters in the possibility of exploiting technological spillovers12.
However, it is not only the relative proximity of the follower to the technolog-
ical frontier to be important in de￿ning the cost function for imitation, however.
We innovate on Barro and Sala-i-Martin (1997) formalization, by assuming the
cost of imitation to be decreasing in the share of high skilled workforce employed
in imitation activities in the economy.
Noticeably, regarding the impact of the share of high skilled workers on the
cost of imitation, our assumption is somehow alternative to the one of Vanden-
bussche, Aghion and Meghir (2004) in which a low skilled worforce is assumed to
be better suited for imitation tasks than a more skilled one. In Vandenbussche,
Aghion and Meghir (2004) an increase of the share of unskilled workforce (when
region 2 performs imitation) results to be growth enhancing since the elasticity
of unskilled labor is higher in imitation than in innovation13. We believe, in-
stead, that imitation requires a consistent amount of skills at any development
stage.
We rely on the economic intuition of Nelson and Phelps (1966) for which
the speed of technology catch-up is a positive and increasing function of human
capital levels. The higher the human capital of a lagging economy and the faster
its technological catch-up. Nelson and Phelps (1966) argue how "it is clear that
the farmer with a relatively high level of education has tended to adopt productive
innovations earlier than the farmer with relatively little education [...] for he is
better able to discriminate between promising and unpromising ideas [...] The
less educated farmer, for whom the information in technical journals means less,
is prudent to delay the introduction of a new technique until he has concrete
evidence of its pro￿tability".
We insert into this same line of reasoning by arguing how reverse engineering,
on which a considerable part of the imitation activities is based, is more likely
to be performed by engineers rather than by low skilled workers. For this reason
technology imitation is likely to rely on skilled workers while it is the physical
11Even if we formalize this aspect in the theoretical model, in this version of the paper we
still do not take into account this dimension in the empirical part. Results of the theoretical
model remains unchanged however if we drop the parameter ￿:
12Keller (2001) estimated the max geographical distance for technology spillover to take
place in 1,200 kilometers.
13The authors argue how "a marginal increase in the stock of unskilled human capital
enhances productivity growth all the more the economy is further away from the technological
frontier".
11production of the "replicas" used for production of the ￿nal good to be carried
out by unskilled workers. Following this rationale, our formalization implies
that the cost of imitation will be lower the higher the share of skilled workforce
in region 2. More formally combining eq. (22) with eq. (9) we can restate the
cost function for imitation as follows:






Also, ceteris paribus, as we move closer to the technological frontier, the
importance of higher education and technical skills of the workforce performing
imitation and adoption becomes increasingly more important.
4.2 The follower region
Now that we have set the conditions for the cost function of imitation we can
move to the behaviour of region 2. We assume that region 2 starts in a situation
where the cost of innovation is strictly higher than the cost of imitation such
that:
￿2 > ￿2(0) (24)
We assume that once a blueprint is discovered in region 1 it will be available
for adoption by an agent in region 2. We assume that the adoption of the
blueprint by the technological follower implies some sort of adjustment of the
blueprint. The outcome of adoption results to be new intermediate good X2j
which will be similar to the initial one X1j discovered in the leader region but
"ready-to-use" for production in region 2. Similarly to what happens in region 1,
the imitator in region 2 will retain monopoly power over the use of the imitated
good for production.
The monopoly price in region 2 for the jth imitated good, similarly to eq.(14),
will be given by
P2j = P2 = 1=￿ (25)
and also eq.(15) to eq.(17) will be the similar to those for region 1 as follows:






￿2j = ￿2 = (1 ￿ ￿)Ly2(A2)￿(1+￿)=(1￿￿) (28)
The computation of the rate of return in region 2 is, instead, slightly more
complex than that for region 1. This is because the cost of imitation is increasing
over time being a positive function of the ratio N2=N1. For this reason we
12follow the simpler formalization proposed by Barro and Sala-i-Martin (1995)14
by assuming that the follower region is far from the technological frontier and
that the pool of available innovations to be imitated is large so that the rate of







Interestingly, a gap in rate of returns arises between region 1 and region 2
since the cost of imitation in region 2 is initially lower if compared to the cost
of innovation in region 1. This gap is such that r2 > r1 during the transitional
dynamics15.
As in region 1, consumers in region 2 are assumed to maximize the same
Ramsey-type utility function as in eq.(19). This leads to the following expression
for the growth rate of consumption:
￿
C2=C2 = (1=￿)(r2 ￿ ￿) (30)
which ultimately gives the growth rate for region 2 as a function of model
parameters:







5 Steady state and growth dynamics
In our study we are mainly concerned with the growth dynamics of both region
1 and region 2 when imitation and innovation are costly activities and di⁄er-
ences in human capital composition exist between the two regions. However, in
order to be more speci￿c about the dynamic behaviour of the economies it is
convenient to start with the analysis of steady state growth and then to move
to the analysis of the transitional dynamics.
In steady state the two economies are expected to grow at the rate of expan-
sion of the technology frontier, that is at ￿1. By de￿nition, therefore, in steady
state N2 grows at the same rate as N1 so that ￿2 remains constant in accordance
14A slightly more complex formalization is given in Barro and Sala-i-Martin (1997) where
the rate of return for country 2 is expressed by r2 = ￿2=￿2 +
￿
￿2=￿2where r2 includes the
capital gain term
￿
￿2=￿2 which adds to the dividend rate ￿2=￿2: We refer the interested reader
to Barro and Sala-i-Martin (1997), p.8.
15For now it is convenient to notice simply that under the general assumptions given from
eq.(4) to eq. (9), for N2=N1 < (N2=N1)￿ < 1 it will always hold that r2 > r1. The asterisk
superscript represents the technology proximity of the follower w.r.t. leader in steady state.
We will discuss this situation in the next section.
13with eq. (22). Also, C1 grows at the same rate as C2 which corresponds to ￿1
in the long run.
As argued by Barro and Sala-i-Martin (1997), the process of technology
di⁄usion will end up equalizing the rate of returns in the two regions. The
steady state value of the rate of return expressed in eq. (29) for region 2 will be
equal to that of the leader region 1 as follows:
r￿
2 = r1 = ￿1=￿1 (32)
where the asterisk superscript denotes values in steady state for region 2.
Hence, since r￿
2 = r1, eq. (18) and eq.(29) imply:
￿2=￿￿
2 = ￿1=￿1 (33)
where ￿￿
2 represents the corrispective steady state value for the cost of im-
itation ￿2. By combining eq.(17) with eq.(28) we can express the steady state
value for the cost of imitation as a function of the other variables of the model,
leading to the following:
￿￿
2 = ￿1(A2=A1)1=(1￿￿)(Ly2=Ly1) (34)
Now, for any given value of ￿2(t) < ￿￿
2 the follower region 2 will be found
below its steady state. Due to the relative gap in rate of returns between the
technology adoption activity performed by region 2 (which is highly pro￿table at
initial stages of development) and the innovation performed by region 1, region
2 will be growing faster than region 1 during the transitional path16.
One may think of this situtation as region 2 having a cost "comparative
advantage" w.r.t. the leader which makes it able to grow relatively faster.
Nonetheless, as region 2 converges towards the technological level of the leader
(N2=N1 gets bigger) the cost of imitation in region 2 rises up to a point where
region 2 completely exahusts its "growth comparative advantage" and starts
growing at the rate of the technological frontier. That is, ￿2 goes from being
initially higher than ￿1 to a situtation where ￿￿
2 = ￿1 in steady state17. More
formally we have the followings:
￿2(t) = ￿￿
2 () ￿￿
2 = ￿1 (35)
while, during the transition dynamics it will be that
￿2(t) < ￿￿
2 () ￿2 > ￿1 (36)
16This is to say that during the transitional path the cost of imitation in region 2 is lower
than the cost of innovation in region 1 up to the point where ￿2(t) = ￿￿
2 and where the rate
of returns of imitation in region 2 and innovation in region 1 equalize.
17This also implies a technology gap between region 1 and region 2 equal to (N2=N1)￿.
146 Human capital composition
Up to now we have been analyzing the situation for which region 2 grows faster
than region 1 by pro￿tably imitating the technologies discovered in the leader
region. We now recall two general assumptions we made for region 2 in previous
sections which may come at hand now.
Firstly we assumed that the cost of imitation in region 2, ￿2(0), is lower than
the cost of innovation in region 1, ￿1, (condition for which region 2 theoretically
converges to region 1).
Secondly we assumed that in region 2 imitation or adoption is cheaper than
innovation, that is, the cost of imitation ￿2(0) is lower than the corrispective
cost of innovation ￿2 (condition for which imitation is performed rather than
innovation)18. The choice of imitating rather than innovating is therefore based
on the positive gap between ￿2(t) and ￿2. More formally we have been assuming
the following:
￿2(t) < ￿1 < ￿2 (37)
Now, in order to get useful policy making insights we have to switch the
perspective of the analysis from the transitional dynamics path to the analysis
of the relations in the long run.
The crucial question is the following: is imitation an optimal activity in the
long run for the follower regardless of its development stage, human capital
composition and bureaucratic quality?
In particular, the relative composition of human capital (skilled over un-
skilled workers) and the level of institutional quality enter the cost function of
imitation and innovation and therefore de￿ne the conditions for which imitation
may (or may not) be optimal in the long run.
Hence, we are now interested in de￿ning under what general conditions imi-
tation, rather than innovation, results to be an optimal activity for the follower
in the long run. This reduces to ￿nding for which model parameter values the
cost of imitation is lower than the cost of innovation in the long run, that is
￿￿
2 < ￿2:
Putting together eq.(37) with eq.(34) we can restate the following:
￿￿
2 < ￿2 , (A2=A1)1=(1￿￿)Ly2=Ly1 < ￿2=￿1 (38)
18Recall, also, that ￿2 > ￿1 strictly holds, that is, the cost of innovation in country 2 is
strictly higher than the cost of innovation in country 1 due to the relative di⁄erence in human
capital stocks composition across countries.
15This yelds to the following, more general, condition for the relative human




where we rede￿ned the variables as follows19:
￿ = ￿2=￿1 (40)
￿ = (Ly2=Ly1) (41)
￿ = A2=A1 (42)
Crucial for our discussion is that, as long as the disequality in eq.(39) holds,
the steady state cost of imitation for region 2 will be strictly less than the cor-
rispective cost of imitation ￿2 given the economic fundamentals in region 2.
Hence, in that case, the follower will always choose to imitate. This condition
is satis￿ed for relatively low values of the quality of human capital in the fol-
lower region w.r.t. the leader. We restate this condition more formally in the
proposition below.
Proposition 1 As long as di⁄erences in human capital skills between leader
and follower are large the follower region always ￿nds optimal to imitate in
the long run. Improvements in the economic fundamentals of region 2 (both
bureaucratic/institutional quality and human capital and skills) make imitation
increasingly less attractive w.r.t. innovation for the follower region.
The intuition behind this result is as follows. For large enough di⁄erences
human capital composition and bureaucreatic quality between region 1 and
region 2 the steady state cost of imitation in region 2 will be always lower than
its corrispective cost of innovation, that is ￿￿
2 < ￿2. Hence when skills in the
follower region are low enough imitation will result to be an easier and more
pro￿table activity for the follower if compared to innovation.
Being more speci￿c, as regards human capital composition, an increase in
the share of the high skilled workforce in region 2 implies a reduction of the
costs of imitation (as shown in eq. (23)) but also a reduction of the cost of
producing potential innovation (as shown in eq.(9)).
It is evident, in our formalization, that an increase in the high skilled share
of the total workforce results to be generally growth enhancing reagardless of
the type of activity which is carried out by the region under consideration. This,
as it will be clear, it is the main theoretical result on which we want to focus
19Notice that the new variables in eq.(39) are all expressed as the ratio of the follower￿ s
quantities over the leader￿ s in order to make the analysis more readable.
16and that it will be analyzed also from an empirical point of view in the next
sections.
However, the impact of human capital over imitation and innovation activi-
ties is uneven. While an increase of Lr2 implies a proportional decrease in the
cost of producing innovation, its impact on the imitation cost depends on the
actual proximity to the technological frontier, N2=N2 , that is on the follower￿ s
development stage as shown in eq.(23).
Ceteris paribus, increasing the high skilled content of the follower￿ s workforce
leads to an increase of the ratio ￿=￿. This implies, on the other hand that the
disequality in eq. (39) is gradually less likely to hold for any given value of
model parameters in the follower region. To put it in other words, imitation
becomes less attractive in the long run when the economic fundamentals of the
follower improve, namely when the share of high skill human capital in the
follower increases.
Regarding to the institutional quality di⁄erences between region 1 and 2, as
expected, they play a role in the de￿nition of the conditions for which imitation
rather than innovation results to be optimal in the long run. In particular we
￿nd how an increase in the quality of institutions in the South implies a minor
attractiveness of imitation w.r.t innovation with the disequality in eq.(39) being
less likely to hold for high values of A2. Even if it is di¢ cult to determine the
causality between institutional improvements and economic development20, it
is clear how the two phenomena evolve on parallel paths and usually coexists21.
Proposition 2 The long-run technological proximity between region 1 and 2
depends on the relative di⁄erences in the composition of human capital, on dif-
ferences in institutional and bureaucratic quality and on the geographical distance
between the two regions which diminishes the strength of technological spillovers.
This result can be seen clearer when we derive the expression for the steady
state value of the technology gap (N2=N1)￿ between region 1 and 2. Combining
eq.(22) with eq.(34) makes it possible to derive a unique value for N2=N1 which
satis￿es the steady state condition ￿2(t) = ￿￿








20See Hall and Jones (1999) for an example of this analysis.
21As in Acemoglu, Aghion and Zilibotti (2006), it is here evident how some "poor institu-
tional arrangements" may optimally arise at initial stages of development of a country (in our
case the consideration holds at a regional level) but that these will be abandoned as a country
catches up with the frontier.
17Interestingly, the long run proximity of region 2 w.r.t. technological frontier
is an increasing function of the institutional quality endowement of the follower,
namely of ￿: This can be seen by examination of eq.(34) and eq.(43). Better
institutions in region 2 are associated with higher technology levels in the long
run. Also, the larger the geographical distance across regions, the higher ￿, and
the lower will be the technological proximity in the long run.
More importantly for our discussion is that an increase in the fraction of
population endowed with higher skills in region 2 leads to the achievement of
a higher long-run technological proximity w.r.t. the leader region. It is there-
fore the high skill content of the total workforce to be crucial and conductive
to higher growth and higher levels of output in the long run. We show the
implications of our proposition in the graph below:






2 = ~ Lr2) where the tilde denotes
the situation for which imitation is indi⁄erent w.r.t. to innovation in region 2.
Increasing the fraction of the workforce with high skills ￿ attens the cost function
for imitation in region 2. Technology spillovers are now easier to be received
and technological growth in region 2 goes at a faster pace. Crucially, however,
once ￿￿
2 = ￿2 region 2 becomes indi⁄erent on whether performing imitation or
innovation. Hence, when Lr
000
2 = ~ Lr2 holds unique value for (N2=N1)￿
Lr000 is
found which represents the maximum proximity w.r.t. technological frontier
attainable in imitation given the speci￿c economic fundamentals of region 2.
Corollary 3 Given the follower￿ s particular human capital composition, insti-
tutional quality and development stage an upper bound level for the skill content
of human capital in region 2 is found such that the follower is indi⁄erent on
whether performing imitation or innovation; ~ Lr2 ￿ (￿=￿)1￿￿ = ￿
￿1.
Proposition 4 A rise in the fraction of population with a higher level of ed-
ucation is growth enhancing under plausible conditions. Conversely, a rise in
the fraction of population with a lower degree of education is growth diminish-
ing. The result applies in imitation or innovation for both region 1 and region
2 economies. The result holds as long as basic education is positive.
This result can be seen by the inspection of the growth rate in eq. (21) for
the leader or from its corrispective in eq.(31) for the follower. Everything else
being equal, the growth rate of the economy is a function of the level of educated
(skilled) over uneducated (unskilled) workers in the economy. Taking the partial
derivative of the growth rate w.r.t. Lri and imposing this to be greater than









[1 ￿ 2Lri] (44)
1819Due to the assumptions made on the model parameters in order to ensure







always greater than zero. This leads to the following:
@￿i
@Lri
> 0 , Lri < 1=2 (45)
The derivative in eq.(44) shows how an increase in the skilled fraction of
workforce is growth enhancing for plausible values of Lri, that is for values of
Lri below the half of the total population. Instead, the opposite is true for the
unskilled population. That is, when Lyi is above 1/2 an increase in the fraction
of population with a lower degree (which decreases the fraction of those with a
higher one) will be growth detrimental.22
This result points also to the importance that basic education has on growth.
This is to say that the positive marginal impact of higher education on tech-
nology convergence holds as long as basic education is considerably spread (in
levels) in the follower economy (in our case it must be that Lyi > 1=2). Once
this condition is satis￿ed, that is that basic education is guaranteed to a high
fraciton of the population, then an additional increase in the basic education
can be growth detrimental if compared to the positive e⁄ect that, instead, would
have an increase in higher education.
Proposition 5 An optimal growth path for the follower can be found given its
economic fundamentals. This path implies a switch from imitation to innova-
tion at high development stages. Improvements in institutional quality, ￿, and
increases in the high skilled share of follower workforce are growth enhancing
and may theoretically lead to leapfrogging of region 2 w.r.t. region 1.
From the analysis of the propositions above we know that it is the upper
bound level for human capital skills that makes region 2 indi⁄erent on whether
imitate or innovate is ~ Lr2. This upper bound de￿nes the higher long run tech-
nology proximity that region 2 can achieve w.r.t. region 1 in imitation, that is,
( ~ N2= ~ N1)￿.
A higher proximity w.r.t. the technological frontier, however, can be achieved
by switching to innovation once ( ~ N2= ~ N1)￿ has been reached. Crucially, if region
2 starts innovating above ( ~ N2= ~ N1)￿ the new steady state value for technology
proximity of region 2 w.r.t. region 1 will be still an increasing function of the
high-skill content of its human capital.
22In both cases the relation between the increase in the share of high skilled human capital
and the growth rate of the economy is not linear and it encounters diminishing returns pointing
to possible duplication e⁄ects as argued by Romer (1990).
20Convergence in technological levels is therefore conditional in the sense that
it depends on the economic fundamentals of the two economies. Let us express
the attainable income ratio between region 2 and region 1 in the long run by







^ N2= ^ N1
￿￿i
(46)
However, the income ratio between the two economies will not remain con-
stant due to the relative di⁄erences between the economic fundamentals of region
2 w.r.t. those of region 1 which is still more e¢ cient in producing innovation.
Hence, increasing the fraction of workforce with higher skill is not su¢ cient to
achieve absolute convergence with the leader. In fact, as expected, unless re-
gion 2 improves on its economic fundamentals it will be "trapped" in a high
development stage (depending on its relative composition of human capital and
institutional quality). This scenario captures the situation of those regions at the
frontier which are developed but still fail in reaching the exact income standard
of the leaders due to small but persistent di⁄erences in R&D or institutional
quality.
As region 2 improves on its economic fundamentals it gets to a higher
steady state technological proximity to the leader. Absolute convergence may
be achieved, therefore, by rising the high skilled fraction of total workforce or
the overall institutional quality of the economy. In fact, from eq.(9), eq.(40)
and the corrispective for economy 2 of eq.(44) it may be seen how an increase
in Lr2 will imply a decrease in ￿, the ratio ￿2=￿1 which represents the inverse
of the e¢ ciency of the R&D sectors in the two economies. Similarly, also an
increase of institutional quality of region 2 ends up leading to an increase in the
ratio (Y2=Y1)
￿ by rising the parameter ￿: To conclude, leapfrogging of region 2
w.r.t. region 1 is also possible when region 1 becomes intrinsically inferior w.r.t.
region 2 in its economic fundamentals, institutional quality and human capital.




This part of the paper will be devoted to the empirical test of the dynamics
underlined in the theoretical model presented before. Our analysis will be fo-
cusing on the 17 Comunidades Autonomas espaæolas 23 as well as on 50 spanish
provinces. The time span selected ranges from 1960 to 1995 for the analysis on
the regions and from 1965 to 1997 for the analysis of the province case. The
23Our sample is Andaluc￿a, Arag￿n, Asturias, Baleares, Canarias, Cantabria, Castilla y
Le￿n, Castilla la Mancha, Cataluæa, Comunidad Valenciana, Extremadura, Galicia, Madrid,
Murcia, Navarra and Pais Vasco.
21two cases, the regional and the province analysis, di⁄er in the databases that
are going to be employed for both the GDP values and human capital variables.
If, on one hand, this is somehow a natural constraint we have to face due to
the human capital data availability at the spanish regional level (the data that
we use for the regional case are not available from the same source also at the
regional level), on the other hand, it allows us to exploit two di⁄erent databases
and, therefore, to infer something on the overall robustness of the results when
the analysis is not only carried out at two di⁄erent aggregation levels but also
with two di⁄erent datasources.
The regional analysis exploits a 5-year dynamic panel model while the case
of the provinces, due to the higher frequency of the data, the dynamic panel will
be of 4-years span. The GDP series used in the regional case is expressed in per
capita terms and is made available by the Fundaci￿n BBVA. The data used as
a proxy for regional di⁄erences in human capital stocks are those proposed by
de la Fuente, DomenØch and Jimeno (2006). These data conveniently allow us
to disaggregate the population of age 25 and over by categories of educational
attainment. To be more speci￿c we focus on the following educational attain-
ment categories: (HK1) primary - primaria, graduado escolar whose duration
is 5 years, (HK21) lower secondary - EGB, Bachiller elemental, ESO whose du-
ration is 3 years, (HK22) upper secondary - Bachillerato, COU, FP I and FP II
whose duration is 4 years, (HK31) higher education, ￿rst level - Diplomatura,
Peritaje whose duration is 2 years and ￿nally (HK32) higher education, second
level - Licenciatura whose duration is 3 years.
The data for the GDP at the province level comes also from the BBVA
Foundation while the data for the human capital at the same disaggregation level
comes from the "Human capital series" provided by the IVIE in collaboration
with Bancaja.24
The human capital series at the province level refers to the following nomi-
nal categories: (HK1) "analfabetos" or with no education, (HK2) "primaria"or
primary schooling, (HK3) "medios" or secondary schooling, (HK4) "antes-
superiores" or vocational training and (HK5) "superiores" or higher education.
The data are here expressed in thousand of people employed (active population)
for each branch of educational attainment.
If we compare the two human capital databases we will notice how the cat-
egory (HK3) and (HK4) of the human capital series for the provinces refer
to those educational attainment levels ranging from the secondary compulsory
education (for the HK3) to the pre-university degrees. These two categories,
therefore, correspond partly to those (HK21), (HK22) and (HK31) of the re-
gional classi￿cation given in de la Fuente, DomenØch and Jimeno (2006) data-
base. HK5, instead, corresponds to the higher skill margin of the workforce
24See: http://ivie.es/banco/capital.php?idioma=EN for more details
22in the province database while, in the regional case its corrispective is named
HK32.
Our study is also concerned with the role played by institutional quality
when this interacts with human capital levels in de￿ning the growth path of the
economies.
Data proxying for the institutional quality at the regional and provinces level
is very hard to ￿nd. To the best of our knowledge, the best approximation for the
spanish case are the data for Social Capital provided by the IVIE in collaboration
with the BBVA Foundation. These data focus on the role of cooperation and
trust in achieving collective or economic results and it may be an adequate proxy
at the regional and province level of the quality and correct functioning of their
institutions. In particular, the approach followed in the construction of the data
for spanish social capital focused on the "social relationships that evolve in the
economic sphere, particularly in employment, ￿nancial or investment markets,
in which long-lasting relationships exist in contexts of uncertainty and strategic
interdependence".25
The data for social capital matches our sample at the regional and province
level for the period in between 1981 and 1997. This is a shorter time span if
compared to the data we have available on human capital and GDP.
Due to the already small number of observations for the regional case26
the use of the social capital data in the context of the regional analysis has
been therefore dropped. Its use, instead, for the provinces case reduce the
sample from 400 observations to 250 observations27 so we decided to propose
the empirical analysis of the impact of human capital composition either with
and without controlling for institutional quality di⁄erences at the province level.
7.2 Methodology
The relation between education and economic growth is likely to be heavily
a⁄ected by severe problems of endogeneity. In other words, the covariates may
not be orthogonal to the error process and the resulting estimates may not be
consitent. Usually in a cross-section context, this problem is solved by using
instrumental variables techniques (IV) which rely on instrumental sets which are
assumed not to be correlated to the error process but at the same time highly
correlated to the suspected endogenous variables. Unfortunately, economists
usually face huge problems in ￿nding such instrumental sets.
Within the dynamic panel settings this problem is usually adressed by mak-
ing use of ￿rst-di⁄erence GMM estimators such as those proposed by Arellano
25See IVIE, http://ivie.es/banco/ksocial.php?idioma=EN.
26Without the use of social capital we have 119 observations.
27In the case of the system GMM estimation.
23and Bond (1991) or Arellano-Bover(1995)/Blundell-Bond (1998). These estima-
tors allow to build internal instrumental sets relying on the moment conditions
produced by exploiting lagged realizations of the variables in the model (both
dependent and exogenous/endogenous ones).
In our particular analysis, moreover, we face another problem related to the
educational variables we are going to exploit. As argued by Castell￿ (2006)
educational variables are usually highly persistent over time. It is well known
that system GMM estimators for dynamic panel data models generally perform
better than standard ￿rst-di⁄erence estimators when variables are persistent.
Blundell and Bond (1998) show that when the considered variables are close
to random walk processes then the di⁄erence GMM estimators behave poorly
because past levels of these variables convey little information about future
realizations.
To be slightly more speci￿c, as pointed out by Roodman (2006), the Arellano
and Bover (1995) and Blundell and Bond (1998) estimators augment the stan-
dard Arellano and Bond (1991) procedure by assuming that ￿rst di⁄erences of
instrumenting variables are uncorrelated with the ￿xed e⁄ects and by allowing
the introduction of more instruments which consistently improve the e¢ ciency
of the estimator. Formally the system GMM estimator assumes the following:
E [￿Wi;t￿1"i;t] = E [￿Wi;t￿1￿i]+E [Wi;t￿1￿i;t]￿E [Wi;t￿2￿i;t] = 0+0￿0 (47)
where ￿i are the ￿xed e⁄ects and ￿i;t are the idiosyncratic shocks. Wi;t
represents instead the endogenous regressors. If the condition above is satis￿ed
then ￿Wi;t￿1 is a valid instrument for the variables in levels28. This said,
however, one condition that must be satis￿ed both by ￿rst-di⁄erence and system
GMM estimators is that the errors must not be second order serially correlated.
Formally it must also hold the following:
E [("i;t ￿ "i;t￿￿)Wi;st￿￿] = 0 with s ￿ 2 (48)
7.3 The empirical model
We are interested in testing one of the main predictions of the theoretical model
we built in previous sections. In particular, our hypothesis is contained in eq.
(46) in which we put in relation the relative gap in GDP across regions with
their initial technological levels, their speci￿c human capital composition and
with the institutional quality levels.
As pointed out before, the theoretical model predicts that an increase in
the fraction of skilled workforce will be growth enhancing and conductive to
28The new estimator builds on a system of two equations (the original and a transformed
one) and it is nowadays known as "system GMM".
24convergence in income levels across regions. Viceversa, increasing the unskilled
content of the workforce will be growth detrimental and conductive to larger
GDP gaps in the long run across regions with the follower converging towards
lower GDP steady state levels. Also, an increase in the institutional quality
of the region/province is expected to impact positively its GDP level and be
conductive to convergence to the frontier￿ s GDP levels.
The econometric speci￿cation we choose to use is a simpli￿cation of eq. (46)
and takes the following form:
GDP gapi;t = c + ￿1SK + ￿2Educationi;t￿￿ + ￿3GDPi;t￿￿ + ￿i + ￿i;t (49)
where we de￿ne the GDP gap as the log of the ratio between the GDP of
each observed region w.r.t. to the value for Madrid which we assume to be our
empirical leader region. The initial GDP, is inserted in our speci￿cation in order
to control for the initial development stage of each reagion. This is to say that
we control for initial income di⁄erences across regions in order to properly isolate
the partial contribution of human capital composition in the de￿nition of long
run GDP gaps. Education will be the focus of our analysis proxying for regional
and province di⁄erences in skill levels. Also, SK represents Social Capital and
it will be used in the province-level analysis to proxy for institutional quality.
7.4 Econometric results
7.4.1 Regional results: Pooled OLS
As a preliminary check of the theoretical results of our model assumptions we
decided to run a pooled OLS regression of the speci￿cation proposed in eq. (49).
The dependent variable, the GDP gap of each region w.r.t. the leader, is
regressed on the educational attainment levels and on initial GDP levels. Results
look encouraging even if the empirical methodology - pooled OLS - is probably
not adequate in our context due to the very likely presence of endogeneity of
the explanatory variables, human capital, w.r.t. GDP levels.
In the ￿rst column we decided to examine all the educational attainments at
once even if this may create multicollinearity problems since the variables are
likely to be highly correlated one another. In fact, in the ￿rst column of table 1
only the last two coe¢ cients (those for L1 and L21) are statistically signi￿cant.
This said they actually enter with expected negative sign indicating how an
increase in the unskill-content of the workforce is associated to an increase of
the GDP gap across regions (followers w.r.t. the leader Madrid) in the long run.
In the second column, then, we decide to focus on a small subset of explana-
tory variables in order to better distinguish among educational levels. Hence we
25use only higher education-secondary level (L32) and lower secondary (L21) as a
proxy of the skilled and unskilled fractions of the population. Here, the results
are clearer and coe¢ cients enter with strong statistical signi￿cance. Here below
in table 1:
[TABLE 1 ABOUT HERE]
The coe¢ cient for "high education" enters with the expected positive sign
indicating the positive role played by higher education in the reduction of the
GDP gap across regions. At the same time, the coe¢ cient for lower secondary
education is instead negative con￿rming our initial assumptions. The same re-
sult holds when instead of considering lower secondary education we insert up-
per secondary educational attainment in the third column. Again the coe¢ cient
for higher education scores a positive sign while the one for upper secondary
(proxying for low education) is negative.
As pointed out before, however, these estimates are likely to be biased due
to endogeneity of the regressors w.r.t. the dependent variable. For this reason
we move to the use of Di⁄erence and System GMM estimators which allow us
to build internal instrumental set to address the problem of endogeneity of the
regressors and provide consistent and unbiased estimates. In the next sections
below we propose the results.
7.4.2 Econometric approach
The Arellano-Bond (1991) and Arellano-Bover (1995)/Blundell-Bond (1998) dy-
namic panel estimators have nowadays become increasingly popular. The two
estimators are especially designed for situations in which the number of indi-
viduals within the panel is relatively larger than the time dimension. Also, and
this comes at a hand in our context, these estimators are well suited when the
left-hand-side variable (which is dynamic in nature) depends on its own past
realizations as well as on other independent variables which are however not
strictly exogenous.
The so called Di⁄erence GMM estimator relies on the transformation of all
regressors, usually by di⁄erencing them, and it uses the Generalized Method of
Moments (Hansen 1982). The System GMM estimator, instead, relies on the ad-
ditional assumption that is that ￿rst di⁄erences of instruments are uncorrelated
with the ￿xed e⁄ects allowing the introduction of more instruments. This, as
pointed out by Roodman (2006), can dramatically improve e¢ ciency especially
when, as in our case, the explanatory variables are likely to be persistent and
to be weak instruments in a simpler Di⁄erence GMM estimation. Here below
therefore we propose the System GMM results of our baseline speci￿cation in
eq. (49). The ￿rst two columns refer to the one-step System GMM estimation
while the third one is the result of a two-step robust estimation.
26The two-step variant of the System GMM makes use of an "optimal" weight-
ing matrix which is the inverse of the estimate of V ar[z0"], where z is the in-
strument vector and " the error term. This ￿ optimal￿weighting matrix makes
two-step GMM asymptotically e¢ cient. The nice property of the two-step es-
timation, however, comes with the cost of having to estimate the vector of
moments between instruments and errors, which are fourth moments of the un-
derlying distributions. In small samples, as argued by (Hayashi, 2000, p. 215)
it can be unfeasible to estimate such vector so that the estimation of such an
optimal weighting matrix may be singular.29
Also, for all the estimation which will follow, we will make use of an addi-
tional correction to the estimated standard errors. In the one-step SysGMM
estimation we always correct for the presence of any pattern of heteroskedastic-
ity and autocorrelation within panels (in table 2, for instance, this correction is
run for column (i) and (ii)). These estimators are named robust (see footnote
in each table).
For all the two-step estimations, instead, the standard covariance matrix
should be already robust in theory, but typically yields standard errors that are
severly downward biased (Arellano and Bond 1991; Blundell and Bond 1998).
For this reason, we use the correction to the two-step covariance matrix pro-
posed by Windmeijer (2005)30 and then made available in STATA by Roodman
(2006). This correction, is argued, can make the two-step robust estimation
more e¢ cient than robust one-step especially for system GMM. For this reason
this latter will be our preferred econometric speci￿cation.
Another important issue, which is severly underestimated in the empirical
literature which deals with Di⁄erence and System GMM estimators is the pos-
sible over￿tting of the endogenous variable by a too numerous instrumental set.
As pointed out by Roodman (2008), the software routines which are usually
employed for the computation of these estimators produce an excessive num-
ber of instruments which may actually over￿t the endogenous variable both in
Di⁄erence and System GMM. The econometrician, therefore, must pay much
29As pointed out by Roodman (2006): " When S is singular, carrying out the second
estimation step in FEGMM then requires the use of a generalized inverse of S. In Di⁄erence
and System GMM, this breakdown tends to occur as j approaches N (Arellano and Bond,
1998), a fact that has also contributed to the idea that N is a key threshold for safe estimation.
The recourse to the generalized inverse does illustrate how a high instrument count can lead
two-step GMM far from the theoretically e¢ cient ideal. But it does not make two-step GMM
inconsistent￿ the choice of weighting matrix does not a⁄ect consistency￿ so it is not obvious
that j = N is a key threshold for reliability".
30As pointed out by Roodman (2006), "the usual formulas for coe¢ cient standard errors
in two-step GMM tend to be severely downward biased when the instrument count is high.
Windmeijer (2005) argues that the source of trouble is that the standard formula for the
variance of FEGMM is a function of the ￿ optimal￿weighting matrix S but treats that matrix
as constant even though the matrix is derived from one-step results, which themselves have
error. He performs a one-term Taylor expansion of the FEGMM formula with respect to the
weighting matrix, and uses this to derive a fuller expression for the estimator￿ s variance".
27care in the de￿nition of the instrumental set. If the endogenous variable is over-
￿tted by too many instruments the estimator will produce unplausibly good
Hansen-test results with a P-value very close to 1. As a rule of thumb it is
argued we should constraint the number of instruments to be not more than
the number of individuals in our sample. We follow strictly this rule in our esti-
mates both for the regional and provinces case so our restults are robust to the
argument of instrumental proli￿cation which, as we pointed out, is nowadays
usually underestimated.
7.4.3 Regional results: System and Di⁄erence GMM estimations
For all speci￿cations (one-step and two-step system GMM estimations), the
coe¢ cient for second-higher education (HK32) show the expected sign and it
is statistically signi￿cant at 1 percent con￿dence level. This result argues for
the positive and important impact that the high skilled margin of the work-
force would play in the process of GDP convergence at the regional level as
hypothesized in the theoretical model.
The lowest educational categories (HK1 and HK21), primary schooling and
lower secondary are found, instead, not to be statistically signi￿cant pointing to
a weak role played by these educational categories (when examined altogether)
on economic growth and regional convergence mechanisms.
The intermediate educational attainment categories, instead are statistical
signi￿cant. The upper secondary category (HK22), proxying for professional
training, college and technical college educational levels (FP I and FP II) show
a positive sign while (HK31) is negative and statistically signi￿cant (Diploma
degree).
[TABLE 2 ABOUT HERE]
Another explanation may be that those two educational categories should be
merged, representing the overall intermediate educational attainment level. We
do so in the next results were we aggregate in di⁄erent ways the human capital
attainment levels in order to check the robustness of the results obtained on the
high skill margin of the workforce.
[TABLE 3 ABOUT HERE]
On one hand, the positive sign for (HK22) is probably due to the pecu-
liar preparation of those attending the technical college who productively enter
the job market. In a context of technology imitation/adoption (as it it is in
28our model) their specialized know-how may be assimilated to that of higher
educational levels (those coming out from the professional training are usually
engineers and technics) in the role that they may play in the adoption and de-
velopment of new technologies (the productive engine of both the leader and
follower regions).
On the other hand, instead, those attending the Diploma degrees are usu-
ally receiving a less specialized and technical-intensive education (but usually
broader in contents) and they better ￿t in the de￿nition of lower technically
skilled workers. These workers, not having had, or having had less, technical-
intensive preparation which may be spent in technical reverse engineering or
adoption of new technologies, are therefore as in the theoretical model impact-
ing negatively growth prospect.
In tables 5 and 6 we try di⁄erent alternative aggregations for the analyzed
educational attainment levels. In column (i), (ii) nad (iii) we aggregate the
top educational margin by summing up the HK32 and HK31 categories and
leaving the remaining HK1, HK21 and HK22 in the broader "lower" educational
category. The results for this aggregation (which only di⁄er in the type of
estimation procedure and on the insertion of time dummies) show again how
the top educational margin (even if di⁄erently aggregated) remain statistically
signi￿cant at 1 percent level showing a positive coe¢ cient. Instead, the lower
bound is always not statistically signi￿cant pointing to the weak impact of the
low skilled fraction of active population to convergence across spanish regions
in GDP levels.
As argued before, however, this is not the only possible educational aggre-
gation. We tried, therefore, to aggregate the intermediate educational levels
(HK22 and HK31) into a unique category and re-run the System GMM esti-
mations looking at 4 educational categories, primary or basic schooling (HK1),
lower secondary (HK21), intermediate (HK22+ HK31) and higher education
(HK32).
Results again seems to con￿rm the uneven and non-lineal impact that hu-
man capital composition has on GDP convergence across spanish regions. In
particular, HK32 is again statistically signi￿cant and positive while the impact
of the intermediate educational category (the aggregation of HK22 and HK31)
is this time not statistically di⁄erent from zero. Not surprisingly, instead, basic
education scores a positive and statistically signi￿cant coe¢ cient pointing to the
need of some degree of education in order to positively grow in the medium-long
run.
[TABLE 4 ABOUT HERE]
297.4.4 Provinces results: System and Di⁄erence GMM estimations
The results at the regional level are interesting per se when pointing to the
important role that high skilled workers may play in the process of technological
and GDP catch-up. Nonetheless, the analysis at this aggregation level brings
about some shortcomomigs. The ￿rst of these is that the sample size is reduced
to 119 observations. The second is that, due to this small sample, we are not
able to introduce into the model any proxy of institutional quality di⁄erences
across regions for which we have reduced even more the sample size.
The analysis at the province level allows us to address these two shortcomings
by making use of a di⁄erent (larger) database and therefore, also, to check the
sensitivenness of the results to the change in the aggregation level as well as to
the change of data source and explanatory variables. The econometric approach
here used will be the same applied to the regional case. Hence, our preferred
estimation will be the two-step System GMM with the correction proposed by
Windmeijer (2005) even if we will propose also additional checks with the one-
step estimation and Di⁄erence GMM.
First, we start with the analysis of the impact of the disaggregated human
capital attainment levels on GDP gaps the province level.31 As pointed out
before, we are now able to propose the results by controlling for the di⁄erences
in the quality of the economic environment (what it is institutions in the the-
oretical model) by proxying for each province￿ s social capital endowment. The
assumption is that a higher level of social capital will be growth bene￿cial and
therefore associated to a reduction in the GDP gaps across provinces.
In column (i) of table 5 we propose the one-step robust SysGMM estima-
tion of the disaggregated human capital categories. The results show again the
non-lineal impact of human capital educational levels on GDP convergence. Ba-
sic/primary (HK2) and higher education (HK5) show a positive and statistically
signi￿cant coe¢ cient estimated at 1 percent con￿dence level. Intermediate ed-
ucational levels,instead, show the expected negative sign with their coe¢ cients
estimated also at 1 percent con￿dence intervals. Results are robust to the econo-
metric estimation speci￿cation. In column (ii) we propose the two-step robust
SysGMM estimation for which results are qualitatively unchanged.
In column (iii) and (iv) we insert the proxy for social capital. The coe¢ cient
for social capital is, as expected, positive and statistically signi￿cant at 1 percent
signi￿cance levels. This result shows how, for those provinces in which trust and
economic cooperation are more developed (proxying for the quality of provinces￿
institutions), the GDP convergence process is actually faster.
Regarding the impacf of human capital composition we ￿nd again that the
high skill margin (HK5) of the workforce impact positively GDP convergence.
31Again, the leader province will be that of Madrid.
30Also, the magnitude of the coe¢ cient seems not to be sensitive to the insertion
of the social capital control. This may be seen as an indirect proof that the
exclusion of this exaplanatory variable in the regional analysis may have not
actually severely biased those coe¢ cients related to human capital.
The intermediate educational attainments are found to be negatively corre-
lated to GDP gaps reduction as expected, while basic education is positive and
statistically signi￿cant. The results are robust to the econometric speci￿cation
applied (both to one-step and two-step SysGMM estimators).
[TABLE 5 ABOUT HERE]
We hence moved to the analysis of the impact of human capital composition
and social capital by aggregating the educational attainment levels as we did
for the regional case. In table 6 and 7 we propose the results for di⁄erent
aggregation measures and econometric estimators.
[TABLE 6 ABOUT HERE]
In columns (i) to (iv) we propose the results for three main educational
cateogries. Basic education correspond to (HK2), intermediate education is
instead represented by (HK3+HK4) while higher education is (HK5). The
results are proposed with and without controlling for social capital and making
use of both two-step robust SysGMM and Di⁄erence GMM.
The results con￿rm our hypothesis for all speci￿cations and econometric
estimators. The higher fraction of human capital (the high skill intensive margin
of the active population) always enters with a positive a statistical signi￿cant
coe¢ cient. This is so when we insert (or drop) the social capital control. Basic
education is again statistically signi￿cant and positive while the intermediate
educational attainment levels are negative and signi￿cant as expected.
Results however may be driven by the particular aggregation we chose for
human capital catefories. For this reason, in table 6 we split the sample into two
broader categories representing skilled and unskilled workers. In particular we
aggregate into the skilled category the two upper categories (HK5 and HK4)
adn in the unskilled one the remaining (HK3 and HK2).
[TABLE 7 ABOUT HERE]
31The results are robust to di⁄erent aggregations of human capital levels and
to the insertion of social capital controls. The aggregation for the unskilled
human capital margin shows a negative impact on GDP convergence and it is
statistically signi￿cant also when we insert social capital into the regression but
in the two-step robust Di⁄erence GMM estimation only.32
8 Conclusions
The debate over education is probably one of the most recurrent in policy mak-
ing. From a regional point of view the disparities in educational attainments
are sometimes very large with follower regions stuck at relatively low level of
development. Also, the role played by technological growth and spillovers is
usually seen as one of the main channels through which economies may grow
and escape poverty.
With this paper we studied the case of spanish regions and provinces by
building a simpli￿ed two-region theoretical model where innovation and imita-
tion are performed. Technology spillovers are ignited by the recipient region￿ s
ability of adopting the technologies coming from the frontier. This ability is
measured in terms of the quality of its human capital. Also, the ability to per-
form own-based R&D is an increasing function of the human capital of each
region.
We merged features from di⁄erent previous contributions such as Barro and
Sala-i-Martin (1997), Helpman (1993) or Grossman and Helpman (1991), Nelson
and Phelps (1966) and Behnabib and Spiegel (2005) in order to formalize the cost
function and dynamics of the follower region. The relative easiness of imitation,
its cost, has been assumed to be a function of the proximity to the technological
frontier as well as of the quality of human capital devoted to imitation in the
follower region. Also, the growth path of the follower economies is put in relation
with its institutional and social capital levels. All these variables have been
shown to be crucial in the de￿nition of the optimal growth path for the follower
region.
In particular, our model shows, under broad conditions, that an increase in
the high skilled share of the total workforce is growth enhancing for both the
leader and the follower implying how it is the high skill margin of the workforce
the one that should be optimally risen in order to achieve higher growth rates.
In the model we present, somehow, we reconcile two strands of theoreti-
cal results. We show how the increase of the high skill content of the follower
32We have been unable to produce a consistent two-step robust System GMM estimation
with the new human capital aggregations. In particular, even if the signs of the coe¢ cients
were those actually expected the Over-ID test was never passed pointing to the weakness of
the overall instrumental set. For this reason we switched to the two-step robust Di⁄erence
GMM estimation which, instead, seems to correctly pass all major signi￿cance tests. Social
capital is however not statistically di⁄erent from zero in both speci￿cations.
32workforce makes innovation increasingly more pro￿table at any stage of devel-
opment such that for high human capital levels innovation will be performed
optimally as in Vandenbussche, Aghion and Meghir (2004). At the same time,
however, as in the original Nelson and Phelps (1966) hypothesis, an increase
in human capital levels will also make imitation and catch-up faster making,
among other things, reverse engineering and technology adoption easier for the
follower regions.
The same applies to any improvement in institutional quality in region 2
which increases the long run proximity of follower economies to the technological
frontier as argued in empirical literature such as Hall and Jones (1999).
We check the main theoretical results of our model on spanish regions and
provinces for the period 1960-1997 by making use of a dynamic panel model. Due
to the particular nature of our data - the use of educational attainment levels to
explain di⁄erence of GDP across regions - our model may su⁄er severely from
endogeneity bias.
For this reason we chose to use appropriate econometrics techniques, namely
two-step Windmeijer small sample corrected System GMM estimators, to test
the hypothesis that increases in the high skill content of regions￿human capital
stocks are conductive to higher growth and to a higher proximity with the
leader in the long run. Hence, we pay particular attention to some of the
main econometric issues in the use of these estimators such as the possibility of
instrumental proliferation and severe bias of the results and relative tests.
Also, the estimations are run over two di⁄erent human capital databases and
are robust to the insertion of additional control variables such as social capital
di⁄erences at the province level.
Our results seem to con￿rm the main hypothesis of the theoretical model.
The impact of human capital on the reduction of GDP di⁄erential across regions
is non-lineal. Higher educational levels enter with a positive coe¢ cient in our
regressions indicating how an increase in the high skill content of each regions
workforce may be conductive to higher economic growth. Instead, intermediate
and lower educational levels seem to negatively contribute to growth in the long
run.
Our result is somehow alternative to some recent empirical ￿ndings in the
regional economic literature such as Diliberto (2006) who seem to point out that
only the increase of the primary education has been the engine of catch-up for
Italian southern/follower regions in a model of technological convergence. We
believe this result to be puzzling somehow. In fact, when we properly deal with
endogeneity issues as well as with the persistence of the educational series which
may be poor instruments in simple IV estimations, we are able to show that
not only basic education enters with a positive sign in the regressions but that
33much of the GDP convergence is actually exaplained by the higher education
margin of the workforce.
Table 1
Dependent Variable: Regional GDP gap
Pooled OLS Pooled OLS Pooled OLS
(i) (ii) (iii)



































 R2 0.97 0.90 0.97
n. Obs 119 119 119
***, ** Statistically significant respectively at 1%, 5%
Standard errors are corrected for heteroskedasticity and reported  in parenthesis.
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p-values 0.129 0.207 0.155
Hansen test for Over-ID 0.816 1.00 0.219
n. Instruments 25 42 19
Time dummies No No Yes
n. Obs 119 119 119
Note: ***, **,* Statistically significant respectively at 1%, 5% and 10%.
Robust standard error estimates are consistent in the presence of any pattern of
heteroskedasticity and autocorrelation within panels standard errors and are reported in
parenthesis. Two-step System GMM are corrected as in Windmeijer (2005) for finite-sample
covariance  matrix.
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p-values 0.054 0.338 0.319
Hansen test for Over-ID 0.297 0.783 0.783
n. Instruments 18 13 13
Time dummies No Yes Yes
n. Obs 119 119 119
Note: ***, **,* Statistically significant respectively at 1%, 5% and 10%.
Robust standard error estimates are consistent in the presence of any pattern of
heteroskedasticity and autocorrelation within panels standard errors and are reported in
parenthesis. Two-step System GMM are corrected as in Windmeijer (2005) for finite-sample
covariance  matrix.
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Hansen test for Over-ID 0.839 0.839
n. Instruments 26 26
Time dummies No No
n. Obs 119 119
Note: ***, **,* Statistically significant respectively at 1%, 5% and 10%.
Robust standard error estimates are consistent in the presence of any pattern of
heteroskedasticity and autocorrelation within panels standard errors and are reported in
parenthesis. Two-step System GMM are corrected as in Windmeijer (2005) for finite-
sample covariance  matrix.
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(i) (ii) (iii) (iv)





















































p-values 0.393 0.447 0.566 0.789
Hansen test for Over-ID 0.133 0.133 0.202 0.202
n. Instruments 40 40 44 44
Time dummies No No No No
n. Obs 400 400 250 250
Note: ***, **,* Statistically significant respectively at 1%, 5% and 10%.
Robust standard error estimates are consistent in the presence of any pattern of heteroskedasticity and
autocorrelation within panels standard errors and are reported in parenthesis. Two-step System GMM
are corrected as in Windmeijer (2005) for finite-sample covariance  matrix.
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(i) (ii) (iii) (iv)


















































0.129 0.155 0.311 0.380
Hansen test for
Over-ID 0.270 0.254 0.405 0.862
n. Instruments 47 44 50 19
Time dummies No No No No
n. Obs 400 250 350 200
Note: ***, **,* Statistically significant respectively at 1%, 5% and 10%.
Robust standard error estimates are consistent in the presence of any pattern of
heteroskedasticity and autocorrelation within panels standard errors and are reported in
parenthesis. Two-step System GMM are corrected as in Windmeijer (2005) for finite-sample
covariance  matrix.
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0.926 0.909 0.215 0.222 0.660 0.419
Hansen test
for Over-ID 0.672 0.672 0.112 0.112 0.038 0.531
n. Instruments 42 42 37 37 28 14
Time
dummies Yes Yes No No No No
n. Obs 400 400 400 400 250 200
Note: ***, **,* Statistically significant respectively at 1%, 5% and 10%.
Robust standard error estimates are consistent in the presence of any pattern of heteroskedasticity and
autocorrelation within panels standard errors and are reported in parenthesis. Two-step System GMM are
corrected as in Windmeijer (2005) for finite-sample covariance  matrix.
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